WikiLeaks / Sarkozy, le pro-américain, décrit comme "hyperactif" et "impulsif"

Nicolas Sarkozy, salué comme un "pro-américain" invétéré dans les câbles diplomatiques américains publiés par WikiLeaks, n'en est pas moins dépeint comme un président "hyperactif", impulsif et autoritaire, que ses conseillers n'osent pas contredire.
Les télégrammes de l'ambassadeur des Etats-Unis à Paris Charles Rivkin, s'ils se moquent parfois de la personnalité de Nicolas Sarkozy de façon peu diplomatique, soulignent toutefois qu'il est "ouvertement pro-américain" et le décrivent comme un partenaire crucial désireux de rompre avec les traditions pour innover.

Dans le même temps, un mémo de décembre 2009 envoyé à la secrétaire d'Etat américaine Hillary Clinton souligne son côté impulsif.

"Son impatience d'obtenir des résultats et son désir de prendre l'initiative -avec ou sans le soutien de partenaires internationaux et de ses propres conseillers- nous pose le défi de canaliser ses propositions impulsives dans des directions constructives dans l'optique de résultats à long terme", écrit l'ambassadeur.

Les conseillers du chef de l'Etat français évitent de le provoquer, et l'an dernier, ils auraient même fait modifier l'itinéraire de l'avion présidentiel pour éviter qu'il ne voie la tour Eiffel illuminée aux couleurs de la Turquie, rapporte le mémo, dans une allusion à l'opposition de Nicolas Sarkozy à l'entrée de ce pays dans l'Union européenne.

D'une manière générale, ses conseillers "font preuve de peu d'indépendance et semblent avoir peu d'effet quand il s'agit de réfréner ce président hyperactif, même lorsqu'il est le plus lunatique".

En réponse à ces fuites, le porte-parole de l'ambassade américaine Paul Patin a souligné que le "président Sarkozy a prouvé maintes et maintes fois qu'il est un véritable ami des Etats-Unis". "La France est l'un de nos plus proches alliés et notre partenariat n'a fait que se renforcer durant sa présidence", ajoute-t-il.

Nicolas Sarkozy avait jugé mardi en conseil des ministres que la diffusion de câbles diplomatiques américains par le site WikiLeaks constitue "le dernier degré de l'irresponsabilité", selon le porte-parole du gouvernement François Baroin.

WikiLeaks / Poutine raille la démocratie américaine

La Russie n'a pas vraiment digéré un des mémos diffusés par WikiLeaks qui révèle que le secrétaire américain à la défense Robert Gates considère la démocratie russe comme 'disparue'. Le premier ministre, Vladimir Poutine, l'a fait savoir dans un entretien à CNN, diffusé mercredi 1er décembre, dans lequel il raille le système électoral américain.
Dans le document, Robert Gates jugeait aussi que 'le gouvernement est une oligarchie dirigée par les services de sécurité'. Sur la chaîne américaine, l'ancien président russe n'a pas admis que les Etats-Unis s'en prennent au système politique de son pays alors qu'ils ne supportent pas eux-mêmes la critique.

'Lorsque nous expliquons à nos amis américains qu'il existe des problèmes systémiques concernant [le système politique américain], ils nous disent : 'Ne vous mêlez pas de nos affaires.' Nous ne nous en mêlons pas. Mais, chers collègues, je souhaite vous avertir que vous n'avez pas à vous mêler du choix souverain du peuple russe', a souligné M. Poutine.

VOTES AU COLLÈGE ÉLECTORAL

M. Poutine a rappelé que, lors de deux élections présidentielles américaines, le gagnant n'a pas été celui qui a remporté le plus de suffrages populaires, mais celui qui s'est assuré le plus de votes au collège électoral, en référence notamment au scrutin de 2000, dont l'issue avait été in fine décidée par la Cour suprême et qui avait vu la victoire de George W. Bush.

Le président américain n'a donc pas été élu au suffrage universel direct comme en Russie , mais par un collège électoral, lui-même désigné par les électeurs américains, a ainsi souligné M. Poutine.

Le premier ministre a encore estimé qu''il reste pas mal de temps avant l'élection' présidentielle russe de 2012, tout en reconnaissant qu'il se 'concerterai[t]' avec l'actuel président, Dmitri Medvedev, avant de décider lequel des deux serait candidat

WikiLeaks / les liens entre juges français et Washington

WikiLeaks révèle les liens entre des juges antiterroristes français et l'ambassade des Etats-Unis à Paris, qui a eu connaissance des résultats d'enquêtes en principe couvertes par le secret de l'instruction
Ces documents publiés mercredi par Le Monde risquent de conforter les critiques des avocats et des associations de défense des droits de l'homme, qui accusent ces juges de ne pas agir comme des magistrats indépendants, mais comme une branche du pouvoir politique et du renseignement.

Une note du 24 janvier 2005 obtenue par WikiLeaks évoque ainsi un déjeuner de Jean-Louis Bruguière à l'ambassade des Etats-Unis durant lequel il a "évoqué un certain nombre d'enquêtes en cours qu'il conduit", ce qui est en principe illégal puisque le magistrat est tenu au secret.

Un autre document évoque une visite de Jean-François Ricard, autre magistrat antiterroriste, à l'ambassade des Etats-Unis en 2003 pour évoquer une enquête en cours sur le recrutement en France de combattants islamistes pour l'Irak.

Jean-François Ricard, selon les documents évoqués par Le Monde, a en outre expliqué aux diplomates américains avant la présidentielle de 2007 que Jean-Louis Bruguière recherchait "un poste dans la future administration Sarkozy".

Jean-Louis Bruguière, selon d'autres documents, a expliqué ensuite lui-même qu'il voulait être ministre de la Justice. Il s'est présenté comme candidat pour l'UMP aux législatives de 2007 mais a dû renoncer à ses ambitions après sa défaite.

Jean-Louis Bruguière a ensuite été nommé par les Etats-Unis et l'Union européenne à un poste international chargé de vérifier l'utilisation du réseau de transfert international bancaire Swift dans la lutte antiterroriste.

Les juges antiterroristes français, relève une autre note diplomatique américaine, "opèrent dans un autre monde que celui du reste de la justice".

Les Etats-Unis font état de leur admiration pour le système français et l'incrimination "d'association de malfaiteurs en relation avec une entreprise terroriste", où les critères de preuve sont "bien plus faibles que dans les autres affaires criminelles".

WikiLeaks / le 'cauchemar' nucléaire de M. Obama

La question hante les Américains. Et si la bombe du Pakistan, seul Etat nucléaire du monde musulman, tombait un jour entre les mains de terroristes islamistes ? A Washington, le président Barack Obama va jusqu'à confier que le Pakistan est son 'cauchemar privé', selon un télégramme américain publié par WikiLeaks et révélé par Le Monde. Les Pakistanais supportent difficilement que la presse se fasse l'écho de cette obsession de la Maison Blanche qui ne date pas de M. Obama car ils y voient une manoeuvre, voire un complot, visant à mettre leur arsenal nucléaire sous tutelle.

A Islamabad, l'ambassadrice américaine, Anne Patterson (en poste entre 2007 et 2010), rapporte souvent que cette médiatisation du noir scénario nucléaire embarrasse au plus haut point un gouvernement pakistanais placé 'sur la défensive'. Elle n'en continue pas moins d'alerter Washington sur le risque pakistanais. En février 2009, elle l'évalue ainsi : 'Les actifs nucléaires pakistanais sont contrôlés par une armée laïque, qui a mis en place des mesures de sauvegarde étendues. Notre principale inquiétude n'est pas qu'un groupe islamiste puisse subtiliser une bombe entière mais plutôt le risque qu'un individu travaillant au sein des installations gouvernementales fasse sortir suffisamment de matériel fissile pour fabriquer une bombe.'

UNE TENTATIVE QUI A ÉCHOUÉ

Cette inquiétude américaine a motivé une tentative de coopération avec le Pakistan mais qui a finalement échoué. En 2007, le gouvernement pakistanais avait donné son accord de 'principe', selon un câble de l'ambassade américaine, à une opération visant à retirer d'un réacteur nucléaire pakistanais de l'uranium hautement enrichi. Mais l'affaire s'enlise. Les événements du printemps 2009, qui voient la percée des insurgés talibans dans les districts de Swat et Buner (situé non loin d'Islamabad), n'arrangent pas les choses. Le scénario catastrophiste d'un Pakistan nucléaire conquis par les djihadistes refait surface dans la presse américaine

WikiLeaks / le refroidissement américain à l'égard de la Géorgie

En public, le président géorgien, Mikheïl Saakachvili, ne manque jamais une occasion de nier une évidence: l'enthousiasme américain à l'égard de son pays s'est refroidi après la guerre d'août 2008 contre la Russie, puis l'arrivée de Barack Obama à la Maison Blanche. Les innombrables télégrammes adressés par les ambassades à Tbilissi et à Moscou, obtenus par WikiLeaks et traités par Le Monde, précisent cette réorientation politique.LES AVERTISSEMENTS

Avant la guerre d'août 2008 contre la Russie, la Géorgie avait été mise en garde, à plusieurs reprises, sur les dangers d'une escalade avec le puissant voisin. Entre Moscou et Tbilissi, les tensions existaient avant la 'révolution des roses', qui a porté Mikheïl Saakachvili au pouvoir. Mais ce coup de tonnerre démocratique a profondément marqué le Kremlin et renforcé l'idée, dans les élites russes, d'un encerclement militaire et politique par l'Occident.

Le 12 juin 2007, William Burns, le sous-secrétaire d'Etat américain, dîne à Paris avec des diplomates français de haut rang. Le lendemain, Nicolas Sarkozy doit rencontrer Mikheïl Saakachvili. Damien Loras, conseiller diplomatique à l'Elysée, annonce que la France va transmettre un message de 'fort soutien'. 'En privé toutefois, rapporte l'ambassade américaine, les Français ont l'intention de demander à Saakachvili de ne pas provoquer les Russes, d'éviter la montée de tensions'.

Deux semaines plus tard, M. Burns rencontre Mikheïl Saakchvili pour confirmer l'intention américaine de soutenir l'émancipation du Kosovo. Le président s'en inquiète car il craint un précédent sur lequel pourrait s'appuyer la Russie vis-à-vis de l'Abkhazie, région séparatiste de la Géorgie (au même titre que l'Ossétie du Sud).

Selon M. Saakachvili, le plan de M. Poutine est d''utiliser l'Abkhazie pour détruire la Géorgie, résume l'ambassade à Tbilissi. (...) M. Saakachvili a indiqué que, par contraste avec l'Abkhazie, les Russes avaient renoncé à joué la carte de l'Ossétie du Sud contre la Géorgie. Poutine lui a dit qu'il se moquait de l'Ossétie du Sud, tant que la Géorgie [y] évitait un bain de sang et résolvait silencieusement le problème' séparatiste. Pourtant, 14 mois plus tard, c'est sur ce front que s'ouvre le conflit

Wikileaks / bientôt une fuite sur une grande banque américaine?

Sur quoi portera la prochaine fuite de WikiLeaks? Julian Assange, le fondateur de l'organisation, lève le voile sur la réponse dans une interview-fleuve au magazine économique Forbes: cela pourrait être une grande banque. Dans cet entretien réalisé deux semaines avant le Cablegate, Julian Assange affirme que 50% des documents dont il dispose ont trait au secteur privé et estime que leur publication pourrait «tirer vers le fond une banque ou deux». Et on devrait vite savoir lesquelles, puisqu'Assange affirme avoir une «mégafuite» en vue de dizaines de milliers de documents «en rapport avec une banque». Lire la suite l'article
S'ensuit ce dialogue:

«Est-ce que cela concerne une banque américaine?

- Oui, une banque américaine.

- Une qui existe toujours?

- Oui, une grande banque américaine.

- La plus grande banque américaine?

- Je ne commenterai pas là-dessus. [...]

- Qu'attendez-vous de cette publication?

- Je n'ai pas encore d'idée fixée. Je suppose que cela donnera une vision réelle et représentative de la façon dont les dirigeants des banques se comportent, d'une façon qui stimulera des enquêtes et des réformes. [...] Oui, il y aura des révélations sur des violations des règles et des pratiques non éthiques, mais on verra aussi tout le processus de décision et la psychologie des dirigeants en interne»

Même si les fuites sur les mémos diplomatiques américains ont quelque peu déçu, le nombre de documents en ligne s'avérant pour l'instant très limité, cette interview devrait susciter une attente fébrile dans la communauté financière, comme en témoigne la réaction du blogueur Kevin Drum sur Mother Jones:

«Je suis un peu tiraillé sur l'utilité de la publication en masse de milliers de mémos diplomatiques américains. Après tout, les gouvernements ont un besoin légitime de confidentialité. Mais quand j'ai appris cette fuite financière planifiée, je n'ai pas ressenti cette gêne. Une énorme fuite de documents internes d'une grande banque?

WikiLeaks / les critiques du Bahreïn sur le Rafale

Les ambitions françaises d'exporter le Rafale pourraient subir un nouveau coup après la publication par WikiLeaks de documents américains classés dans lesquels il apparaît que le roi du Bahreïn qualifie le chasseur de Dassault Aviation de "technologie du passé"
Selon un câble diplomatique diffusé sur le site internet de WikiLeaks, qui a divulgué cette semaine 250.000 documents américains, le roi Hamad ben Isa al Khalifa a émis cette critique en novembre 2009 lors d'une conversation avec le général américain David Petraeus, alors à la tête du Commandement central américain.

Dassault Aviation s'est refusé à tout commentaire dans l'immédiat.

Selon ce document, le roi du Bahreïn avait demandé à David Petraeus d'inciter les avionneurs américains à participer au premier salon aérien de l'histoire de son pays, prévu en janvier 2010.

"Il a déclaré que la France poussait le Rafale et serait là en force, bien qu'il ait convenu avec Petraeus que le chasseur français était une technologie du passé", peut-on lire dans ce document de l'ambassade des Etats-Unis à Manama.

Le royaume bahreïni est un des nombreux pays du Golfe qui souhaitent renouveler leur flotte aérienne militaire dans un contexte régional de course à l'armement en partie attisée par les ambitions nucléaires de l'Iran, selon des analystes.

Bahreïn achète l'essentiel de ses armes aux Etats-Unis et n'est pas considéré comme le marché le plus prometteur pour le Rafale, mais ces remarques viennent s'ajouter à une série de revers pour l'avion que la France n'a toujours pas réussi à vendre à l'étranger.

Les Emirats arabes unis, acquéreurs potentiels, ont demandé à ce que les moteurs de l'appareil soient améliorés pour gagner en puissance, mais des sources du secteur aéronautique affirment que les négociations avec Paris sont au point mort depuis que les Emirats ont demandé des informations techniques sur le F/A-18 de l'américain Boeing.

En 2007, le ministre de la Défense d'alors, Hervé Morin, avait formulé une critique inverse, jugeant que le Rafale était trop sophistiqué pour être exporté.

La France a également entamé des discussions avec le Koweït, selon un haut responsable français, et espère vendre le Rafale au Brésil, mais Brasilia n'a toujours pas donné de réponse.

Selon ce même document, le roi du Bahreïn aurait également dit au général David Petraeus que les Emirats arabes unis donneraient "bientôt du fil à retordre" à Nicolas Sarkozy au sujet d'un potentiel contrat pour des réacteurs nucléaires.

Un mois plus tard, les Emirats ont conclu l'affaire avec un groupe sud-coréen aux dépens d'un consortium d'entreprises françaises, dont Areva.

Les fuites de documents américains dans la presse, dont WikiLeaks est à l'origine, ont provoqué un tollé dans les capitales occidentales.

La France s'est dite prête à travailler avec les Etats-Unis sur les conséquences diplomatiques de ces publications et s'est refusé à confirmer les propos attribués à ses dirigeants dans ces documents

WikiLeaks / Pékin aurait commandité le piratage de Google

Les Etats-Unis ont la conviction que les autorités chinoises sont à l'origine du piratage informatique de Google, selon des documents secrets révélés dimanche par le New York Times. Parmi les câbles diplomatiques secrets révélés par le site WikiLeaks, un document datant de janvier provenant de l'ambassade des Etats-Unis à Pékin cite 'une source chinoise' selon laquelle le régime communiste aurait commandité le piratage du géant américain de l'Internet, rapporte le quotidien new-yorkais.
'Le piratage de Google s'inscrivait dans le cadre d'une campagne de sabotage informatique organisée par des fonctionnaires, des experts privés des questions de sécurité et des pirates de l'Internet recrutés par le gouvernement chinois', selon le câble cité par le New York Times.

PIRATAGE DES RÉSEAUX AMÉRICAINS DEPUIS 2002

Les services chinois auraient également pénétré les réseaux informatiques des Etats-Unis et de leurs alliés de même que ceux du dalaï-lama, ajoute le journal, et ce depuis 2002.

En mars, Google avait annoncé qu'il n'obéirait plus à l'ordre du gouvernement chinois de censurer son moteur de recherche, expliquant avoir été victime d'attaques informatiques coordonnées. Les comptes de messagerie électronique Gmail de dissidents chinois avaient été violés lors de ces attaques, avait révélé Google. Washington avait fermement soutenu la position du groupe informatique.

Des offensives de pirates informatiques originaires de Chine ont été évoquées par le passé aux Etats-Unis, mais Washington s'est jusqu'à présent gardé de dénoncer publiquement le régime de Pékin.

Merci pour ce partage cher ami. Aurais-tu le dossier des 250000 documents en lien ou à télécharger? Car les autres je les ai mais ceux là impossible de mettre la main dessus!

Et au passage permettez-moi de vous proposer en lecture ce magazine de la semaine :

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 EMBASSY ASHGABAT 000245

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/IR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/25/2020
TAGS: IR PGOV PHUM SNAR PREL TX

SUBJECT: DRUG ADDICTION IN IRAN: THE SUCCESS OF TWELVE-STEP
PROGRAMS

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Sylvia Reed Curran. Reasons 1.4(b) an
d (d).

¶1. (C) An Iranian specialist in the treatment of drug
addiction spoke to Iran Watcher this week about medical and
legal approaches to the problem in Iran. xxxxxxxxxxxx
(please protect), xxxxxxxxxxxx contrasted Turkmenstan's punitie and
abstinence-based, rather than treatment-oriented, stance
towards drug abusers with that of Iran. There, he said,
criminal laws governing drug use have evolved significantly
in the xxxxxxxxxxxx years he has been working in the
field of addiction. In the 1980s, Iran's penal code imposed
harsh sentences on narcotics users, but began to change in
the 90s. This was due in part, he said, to the input of
experts like himself who emphasized the effectiveness of
treatment over retributive justice. These days, drug users
in Iran who are actively seeking treatment are not subject to
criminal penalties.

Narcotics anonymous: 50,000 members

¶2. (C) xxxxxxxxxxxx said that about 20 years ago, three young
Iranians, recovering drug abusers, returned from long
residences in the U.S. and started a branch of Narcotics
Anonymous. Since then, it has grown to an organization of
50,000 members with branches that hold regular meetings
throughout the country. He added that drug use in Iran is a
long-standing problem, dating back several hundred years, and
that it knows no particular socio-economic boundaries. He
cited depression as the most common reason that Iranians
abuse mood altering substances. Despite a significant drug
abuse problem in the country, Iranians actually use (though
do not necessarily abuse) alcohol much more than they do
drugs. In his view, there is a portion of these suffers from
depression that does not respond successfully to therapy and
will always seek mood altering substances. They account for
the 150,000 Iranians who receive regular,
government-sanctioned doses of methadone.

The success of twelve-step programs

¶3. (C) According to xxxxxxxxxxxx twelve-step
programs have been highly successful in treating drug
dependent Iranians, in sharp contrast to other Muslim
countries, such as Egypt and others in the Middle East. He
attributes this to the comfort that Iranians feel culturally
with the tenets of the program, particularly the concept of
"evil." Whereas in Islam, evil is considered to be "a
creation of God that must be eradicated," he said that
Zoroastrianism, the ancient religion of Iran, in contrast,
acknowledges evil as a normal component of human nature that
can be acknowledged and overcome.

Recent problems...

¶4. (C) xxxxxxxxxxxx noted that the ambassador
to the UN was later also relieved of his position and is back
in Iran, with no promise of another government job. He
frequently sees him strolling through a local mall in Tehran.
xxxxxxxxxxxx, says he gets
"a lot of support" from xxxxxxxxxxxx. "If it weren't for

Ashgabat 00000245 002 of 002


him," he said, "I would probably have lost my job long ago."

¶5. (C) COMMENT: Our interlocutor has devoted his career to
learning about and treating drug addiction. xxxxxxxxxxxx
He said that, despite the recent
setbacks and problems he has encountered, there is nothing
else he would rather be doing. "The key," he said, "is
learning to treat those who are drug dependent with
compassion and humanity." END COMMENT
curran

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TAGS: SENV KGHG ENRG FR
SUBJECT: CLIMATE CHANGE - BORLOO SAYS DROP "LEGALLY BINDING"

REF:09 Paris 1635

Classified by Amb. Charles H. Rivkin for Reasons 1.5 (b)(d)

Summary
-------

¶1. (C) French Environment Minister Jean-Louis Borloo told the
Ambassador that the key to advancing climate negotiations is to drop
the notion of a legally binding treaty in favor of a system of
national commitments. He also argued that it would be up to a small
group of eight or ten heads of state, and their sherpas, to negotiate
implementation of the Copenhagen Accord. Borloo attributed the
European obsession with legally binding treaties to its post-war
history and experience in creating the EU by progressively ceding
sovereignty via treaty. The key to reaching this kind of deal would
be credible action on tradable quotas, forests, and finance including
innovative financing mechanisms. The Copenhagen Accord was not a
failure, but allowing the means to become the ends was a trap. End
Summary.

¶2. (C) Ambassador Rivkin called on Minister of State for Sustainable
Development Jean-Louis Borloo on February 11 to review the Copenhagen
Conference and next steps on the Accord. They had last met on the
eve of the conference (reftel.) Borloo expressed in several
different ways the idea that Copenhagen had gone off track because
its approach had been too Western and too European. Major emerging
countries were not prepared to cede sovereignty to a treaty, while EU
members saw this as both normal and essential. Borloo observed that
Copenhagen had, in fact, established a possible global deal on
emissions reductions by the United States, China, and Europe. We
will not get beyond this balance at the next Conference of the
Parties (COP) in Cancun, he said.

¶3. (C) Borloo insisted that UNFCCC COP negotiators did not have the
ability to close a deal after years of ongoing negotiations. It was
now up to the major heads of state. He suggested a group of eight or
ten: Germany and France for Europe, the United States, China, India,
Brazil, Algeria and Ethiopia (and possibly South Africa). Once these
leaders, working through their sherpas or personal representatives
agree on an implementation plan for Copenhagen, it will be largely
acceptable to, and accepted by, the rest of the world, and can then
be returned to a UN forum to be finalized. (Borloo dismissed the
role of Spain as the current EU Presidency country, saying that Spain
has exceeded its Kyoto Protocol targets by 50 percent and is mired by
its internal economic situation. The United Nations also did not
have any leadership capacity to advance the negotiations, he said.)

¶4. (C) Borloo argued that the key to implementing the "equilibrium"
revealed at Copenhagen was an arrangement that would be voluntary but
also automatic in implementation and would include tradable emissions
quotas (with linked carbon markets), a forestry mechanism (REDD
Plus), and financing, including innovative financing and a fast start
mechanism. He commented that China would agree to such a system as
far preferable to a U.S. and EU carbon border tax or tariff
arrangement.

¶5. (C) Borloo thought that adhesion to the Copenhagen Accord would be
more than adequate to establish its acceptance, and he expected most
of Africa and three quarters of the island states to sign on. He
relayed that France continues to advocate adhesion and said that he
personally was travelling and meeting with key country counterparts,
including China and India.


¶6. (C) COMMENT: Borloo conveyed a strategic view of these
negotiations that has changed significantly. We note especially his
assessment that a legally binding instrument is not only unnecessary
but also impossible. He stressed that unlike some Europeans, the
French understood the USG position and had not been critical of the
United States at Copenhagen. In fact, he said, the success of the
Copenhagen Accord for the USG had been the direct engagement of
President Obama. END COMMENT.

¶7. (U) Borloo also passed a letter from himself, on behalf of the
French people, to Secretary of Energy Chu expressing condolences for
the loss of life at the Kleen Energy Power plant in Middletown,
Connecticut, and expressing his wish that those injured in the
explosion recover quickly. The Embassy has faxed the letter to the
Department of Energy.

RIVKIN

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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6552
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 2246
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 0342



C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 000392

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/21/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL RS IR
SUBJECT: IRAN DOMINATES NETANYAHU'S VISIT TO MOSCOW

Classified By: Acting Political Minister Counselor Eric Green for reaso
ns 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (C) Summary: In a two-day visit to Moscow, PM Netanyahu
pressed his case on Iran while the GOR was more focused on
trade than the MEPP. The Israeli PM downplayed disagreements
over Hamas and welcomed government initiatives to help
crisis-depleted economic relations. Netanyahu came away
pleasantly surprised with Moscow's tougher attitude towards
Tehran and the GOR's willingness to countenance sanctions,
even though disagreement remains on their content. Israeli
contacts are confident Russia will not deliver the S-300s to
Iran anytime soon. End Summary.

----------------------
A Special Relationship
----------------------

¶2. (C) In his first official visit to Russia, PM Netanyahu
met with President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin as well
as leaders from Russia's Jewish community. Both sides
described this as a productive visit with "frank but positive
discussions."

¶3. (C) Israeli DCM Roi Rosenblit said Netanyahu's visit
emphasized the "special relationship" between Israel and
Russia. He indicated that this the connection between the
two countries has flourished in the past year. Thanks to
visa free travel, 400,000 Russian tourists travelled to
Israel in 2009.

--------------------------------------------- --
Bilateral Economic and Cultural Ties Increasing
--------------------------------------------- --

¶4. (C) According to Dmitri Lebedov, Second Secretary in the
MFA's Israel and Palestine Department, there was some
discussion of economic issues, including cooperation in
nanotechnology, agriculture, tourism and banking. The
Russian-Israeli Bilateral Economic and Trade Commission last
met in November 2009. The commission is planning another
meeting in 2010 in Jersusalem although a date has not yet
been selected. Lebedev noted that Putin has agreed to visit
Israel in 2010.

¶5. (C) Rosenblit said both sides blamed the economic crisis
for the decrease in bilateral trade in 2009 which affected
Israeli imports of both raw diamonds and petrochemicals.
Both sides are looking for ways to diversify trade to include
more agricultural products. Rosenblit noted that Russia was
very interested in attracting Israeli investment, citing a
bilateral agreement on industrial research and development
which gives both governments the ability to finance joint
start-ups.

¶6. (C) Elaborating on economics issues, Rosenblit said that
Netanyahu and Putin discussed energy issues. Rosenblit said
that Israel had discussed with Russia and Turkey the
possibility of extending to Israel a gas pipeline but this
proposal became unnecessary after Israel found offshore gas
reserves in Haifa. Although Gazprom is still interested in
building facilities in Haifa and aiding in distribution,
Rosenblit said this was now a question for the private
sector. Rosenblit also claimed that an agreement was
reached to launch a bilateral agricultural business forum in
Moscow, possibly in March 2010. This would also be a private
effort, but under governmental auspices. He also said that
there was some discussion about future outer space
cooperation for peaceful purposes.

¶7. (C) Rosenblit claimed that the 65th anniversary of World
War II and Holocaust remembrance were high on the agenda. He
said that both the GOI and the GOR are unhappy with recent
attempts to revise the history of these events. He noted
that a Holocaust Museum will be built in Russia and a
commemorative site recognizing the Red Army's role in WWII
will be constructed in Israel. Rosenblit also said that PM
Putin invited President Peres to the May 9 Victory Day
ceremonies in Moscow later this year. Medevedev also
reportedly green lighted the idea of a cultural program
including a "Year of Russia in Israel" and "Year of Israel in
Russia" exchange.

-------------------------------------------
Middle East Peace Not High on Either Agenda
-------------------------------------------

¶8. (C) According to Rosenblit, MEPP was not thoroughly
discussed and he "doubted that the Moscow Conference
specifically was mentioned." Rosenblit also downplayed the

MOSCOW 00000392 002 OF 003


recent visits of Abbas and Meshaal and the importance
attached to them by the Russians. He said that he believed
Georgia was of greater importance to Russia than Syria,
Lebanon or Palestine.

¶9. (C) Rosenblit said that Netanyahu emphasized his openness
to talks between the GOR and the Palestinians because he
welcomed any way to bring them back to negotiations. "We
wanted everyone to tell Abbas to return to negotiations
because we can't give him a deal until he sits down." He
noted that Israel prefers direct contacts but supports any
kind of negotiations. Rosenblit said that Israel still
insists on talks without preconditions and no interim
agreements: "Nothing is agreed until everything is agreed."
Rosenblit said that Israel supported Russia's efforts to
achieve comprehensive negotiations including Syria and
Lebanon.

¶10. (C) Referring to the recent visit to Moscow of Khaled
Meshaal, Netanyahu told his interlocutors that Hamas should
not be legitimized by other countries. Although Meshaal had
only a 15 minute meeting with Lavrov, it received significant
coverage in the media. Rosenblit said Medvedev asked what
Russia could do to help with Hamas. Netanyahu repeated that
Israel does not see Hamas as a legitimate partner but would
use the Russia-Hamas channel to discuss humanitarian issues
such as the proposed prisoner swap for IDF soldier Gilad
Shalit.

------------------------
Closer than Ever on Iran
------------------------

¶11. (C) Lebedov sought to downplay discussions of Iran saying
that, while it was discussed, other bilateral issues took up
most of the discussions.

¶12. (C) Rosenblit, however, claimed that Iran was clearly at
the top of Israel's agenda for this visit. He said Netanyahu
was "keen to form a group of like-minded parties" who
recognized the danger of Iran's program and would cooperate
to stop its "militant nuclearlization." Netanyahu emphasized
that Israel believes that once Iran has nuclear capabilities,
other regional powers will immediately seek their own nuclear
weapons. Because of this danger, and the threat from Tehran
itself, Netanyahu urged Russia to cooperate on tougher
sanctions against Iran.

¶13. (C) The Israeli side, according to Rosenblit, was
pleasantly surprised at Russia's harsh tone on Iran which had
changed dramatically even since FM Lieberman's visit in
November. "We heard words from them that we've never heard
before," Rosenblit claimed, "and we aren't hearing the same
old arguments." Rosenblit credited this change to the
Iranians themselves, saying that their rejection of the TRR
proposal and their decision to enrich to 20 percent had
toughened Russia's stance on Iran. He remarked that just a
few months ago, there was concern in Israel that Iran would
divide the international community, but Iran's actions have
only served as a unifying factor. "Russia's understanding of
the Iranian nuclear issue is closer to ours than it was a few
months ago."

--------------------------
Ready to Discuss Sanctions
--------------------------

¶14. (C) On the issue of sanctions, Netanyahu reportedly
handed the GOR a list of areas where Israel felt sanctions
could affect change in Iran's behavior. The list included
restrictions on Iranian exports of energy products; Iranian
imports of refined petroleum products; the financial and
banking sectors; and, shipping and aerospace companies. He
noted that, while Russia was ready to discuss sanctions, the
two did not necessarily see eye to eye on the specifics.
Both sides did agree, however, that the UNSC had to agree on
sanctions. Rosenblit said that Russian officials do not
believe that unilateral sanctions will have the desired
effect. They believe that the international community has to
maintain united and either agree to impose or not impose
sanctions.

¶15. (C) Netanyahu encouraged Russia to be an example for
China regarding sanctions. Rosenblit said both Israel and
Russia had been working bilaterally with China to convince
them that it was time for a serious discussion on sanctions.
--------------------------------------------- --
S-300s: No Quid Pro Quo, but We Trust Medevedev
--------------------------------------------- --


MOSCOW 00000392 003 OF 003


¶16. (C) When asked about media reports citing Netanyahu
himself which suggested that Israel had agreed not to restart
arms deals with Georgia in exchange for Russia's continued
inaction on the S-300s contract with Iran, Lebedov noted
that, in spite of this statement, there had been no change in
the GOR's policy. He claimed that fulfillment of the S-300s
contract remained a political decision. He remarked that the
S-300 system was itself defensive in nature and could not be
used against another party, such as Israel.

¶17. (C) Rosenblit also would not acknowledge that a deal had
been made. Instead, he said that Netanyahu had reiterated
his trust in Medvedev regarding the S-300s. According to
Rosenblit, Netanyahu believes that Russia has taken "all
aspects of regional stability" into account when taking
decisions on the S-300s. Rosenblit did note that the S-300s
issue offered a window onto the different vectors in Russian
foreign policy, with the contradictory statements that their
delivery was imminent, and the delay being caused by
technical and political issues, coming just days before
Netanyahu's visit.

¶18. (C) Rosenblit said that neither Russia nor Israel was
linking the S-300 issue with arms sales to Georgia. Israel,
he claimed, as a Russian partner, was "listening attentively"
to Russia's concerns about weapons supplies to Georgia and
the effects this could have in the region. Israel has
friendly relations with Georgia but the Russian relationship
was also very important, he said. He indicated that both
sides were trying to come to an "understanding."

¶19. (C) Comment: The Russian media built up the Prime
Minster's visit as the final stage of Russia's
Abbas-Meshaal-Netanyahu trifecta of Middle East callers.
While both sides paid lip-service to MEPP issues, Iran was
the main agenda item. This reflects Netanyahu's priorities
and the GOR's belief that it is Washington's job, not
Moscow's, to pressure the Israelis on MEPP issues. Israel
came away pleased with Russia's changed posture on Iran, but
disappointed that its list of sanctions was too ambitious for
the GOR. Separately, the widely reported "quid-pro-quo" on a
mutual freeze of the Russian S-300 delivery for Iran and
Israeli military sales to Georgia could be a convenient
Israeli invention. While Israeli contacts say there is no
formal deal, Netanyahu's statements to the media created
enough speculation to put Russia in a corner. Should Moscow
eventually deliver the system to Iran, Israel has a pretext
to step up arms sales to Georgia.
Beyrle

Le quotidien Britannique « The Guardian », via son site internet ; a eu l’occasion d’organiser une interview du fondateur de Wikileaks, le site controversé de divulgation de documents jusque là gardés secrets.
Le public a également pu poser ses propres questions à l’homme le plus recherché par Interpol. Forcément, l’ufologie y a figuré…

Nous remercierons donc un certain « Achanth » qui a posé la question suivante : « Monsieur Assange ; vous a t-on déjà communiqué des documents faisant référence aux OVNI ou aux extraterrestres ? »
Réponse de l’intéressé : « Beaucoup d’excentriques nous contactent par courrier électronique à ce sujet. Certains nous expliquent comment ils ont découvert qu’ils étaient l’Antéchrist en parlant, assis sur une plante verte, avec leur ex-femme à une réception en plein air. Cependant, ils n’ont pas encore satisfait à nos deux règles de publication : que les documents ne soient pas conçus par la source, et qu’ils soient originaux. Cependant, il faut noter que dans certaines parties des archives que nous n’avons pas encore divulguées, il y a en effet des références aux OVNI. »

Source : http://www.zone-ufo.com/9178

INFO LOG-00 MFA-00 EEB-00 AF-00 AGRE-00 AIT-00 AMAD-00
AOP-00 AEX-00 AS-00 A-00 ACQ-00 CIAE-00 CIP-00
COME-00 CCOE-00 CPR-00 INL-00 DNI-00 DIM-00 DODE-00
DOEE-00 WHA-00 PERC-00 DS-00 EAP-00 DHSE-00 EUR-00
FBIE-00 VCI-00 FSI-00 OBO-00 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-00
CAC-00 MED-07 MFLO-00 MMP-00 MOFM-00 MOF-00 M-00
CDC-00 VCIE-00 NEA-00 DCP-00 NRC-00 NSAE-00 ISN-00
OES-00 OIG-00 NIMA-00 PM-00 P-00 ISNE-00 DOHS-00
FMPC-00 IRM-00 SSO-00 SS-00 MR-00 TRSE-00 CBP-00
EPAE-00 SCRS-00 PMB-00 DSCC-00 PRM-00 DRL-00 G-00
ALM-00 SCA-00 SAS-00 FA-00 PMA-00 SWCI-00 /007R


P 182318Z FEB 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO PAGE 02 STATE 015113 182333Z
ALL DIPLOMATIC POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITYS E C R E T STATE 015113

NOFORN, NOT FOR INTERNET DISTRIBUTION

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/29/2019
TAG PTER, PGOV, ASEC, EFIN, ENRG, KCIP

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR INFORMATION:CRITICAL FOREIGN DEPENDENCIES (CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND KEY RESOURCES LOCATED ABROAD)

REF: STATE 6461 PLEASE PASS TO RSO, POLOFF, ECON, and MANAGEMENT (GSO and IT). Classified by S/CT DAS, Susan F. Burk, Reason: 1/4 (B), (D), (E), and (G)

¶1. (U//FOUO) This is an action request; see Para. 13.

¶2. (U//FOUO) Under the direction of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) was written to provide the unifying structure for the integration of critical infrastructure and key resources (CI/KR) protection into a single national program. The overarching goal of the NIPP is to build a safer, more secure, and more resilient America by enhancing protection of the nation's CI/KR to prevent, deter, neutralize or mitigate the effects of deliberate efforts by terrorists to destroy, incapacitate or exploit them; and to strengthen national preparedness, timely response, and rapid recovery in the event of an attack, natural disaster or other emergency.

¶3. (U//FOUO) In addition to a list of critical domestic CI/KR, the NIPP requires compilation and annual update of a comprehensive inventory of CI/KR that are located outside U.S. borders and whose loss could critically impact the public health, economic security, and/or national and homeland security of the United States. DHS in collaboration with State developed the Critical Foreign Dependencies Initiative (CFDI)to identify these critical U.S. foreign dependencies -- foreign CI/KR that may affect systems within the U.S. directly or indirectly. State is coordinating with DHS to develop the 2009 inventory, and the action request in Para. 13 represents the initial step in this process.

¶4. (U//FOUO) The NIPP does not define CI/KR. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD 7) references definitions in two separate statutes. In the USA Patriot Act of 2001 (42 U.S.C. 5195(e)) "critical infrastructure" is defined as systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States the incapacitation or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters. In the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101(9)) "key resources" are defined as publicly or privately controlled resources essential to the minimal operations of the economy and government.

¶5. (U//FOUO) The NIPP identifies 18 CI/KR sectors: agriculture and food; defense industrial base; energy; healthcare and public health; national monuments and icons; banking and finance; drinking water and water treatment systems; chemical; commercial facilities; dams; emergency services; commercial nuclear reactors, materials, and waste; information technology; communications; postal and shipping; transportation and systems; government facilities; and critical manufacturing. Obviously some of these sectors are more likely to have international components than other sectors.

¶6. (U//FOUO) Department is surveying posts for their input on critical infrastructure and key resources within their host country which, if destroyed, disrupted or exploited, would likely have an immediate and deleterious effect on the United States. We expect posts, after consultation among all sections and agencies, will in many instances immediately recognize whether such CI/KR exist in their host country. Posts are not/not being asked to consult with host governments with respect to this request.

¶7. (U//FOUO) Building upon the initial survey completed in 2008, Department requests each post reassess and update information about infrastructure and resources in each host country whose loss could immediately affect the public health, economic security, and/or national and homeland security of the United States. This reassessment may include suggestions from posts for removing, modifying, or adding CI/KR to the list developed in 2008 (see the list of CI/KR identified in 2008 in Para. 15 below).

¶8. (U//FOUO) The following three categories should be considered when determining whether critical foreign dependencies exist in the host country: 1) direct physical linkages (e.g., pipelines, undersea telecommunications cables, and assets located in close enough proximity to the U.S. border their destruction could cause cross-border consequences, such as damage to dams and chemical facilities); 2) sole or predominantly foreign/host-country sourced goods and services (e.g., minerals or chemicals critical to U.S. industry, a critical finished product manufactured in one or only a small number of countries, or a telecom hub whose destruction might seriously disrupt global communications); and 3) critical supply chain nodes (e.g., the Strait of Hormuz and Panama Canal, as well as any ports or shipping lanes in the host-country critical to the functioning of the global supply chain).

¶9. (U//FOUO) Although they are important issues, Department is not/not seeking information at this time on second-order effects (e.g., public morale and confidence, and interdependency effects that might cascade from a disruption).

¶10. (U//FOUO) Posts do not need to report government facilities overseas managed by State or war fighting facilities managed by other departments or agencies.

¶11. (U//FOUO) The following general information should be addressed when nominating elements for inclusion, removal, or modification: -- (U//FOUO) Name and physical location of the asset, system, or supply chain node. -- (U//FOUO) Post's rationale for including, modifying, or removing an asset, system, or supply chain node. -- (U//FOUO) Any information Post has regarding conditions in country causing Post to believe the CI/KR is an active target or especially vulnerable due to natural circumstances. -- (U//FOUO) Any information Post has regarding CIP activities in country and who/what agency is responsible for those activities.

¶12. (U//FOUO) Questions can be directed to Sharri R. Clark in S/CT: ClarkSR@state.sgov.gov; ClarkSR@state.gov; 202-647-1514. Alternatively, questions can be directed to S. Gail Robertson in S/CT: RobertsonSG2@state.sgov.gov; RobertsonSG@state.gov, 202-647-3769.

¶13. (U//FOUO) ACTION REQUEST: Posts are requested to report by March 20, 2009 on CI/KR in their host country meeting the criteria outlined above and a brief explanation of why posts believes the asset meets the criteria. Due to the potential sensitivity of assets identified, posts are asked to consider the necessity of classifying their responses appropriately. Please note the list in its entirety is classified S/NF. If post determines there are no such CI/KR in its host country, a negative report is requested. Please send replies to the attention of Sharri R. Clark in S/CT and use the subject line "CI/KR Response for S/CT".

¶14. (U//FOUO) Posts' assistance with providing input to the first list created in 2008 was invaluable, and Department appreciates Posts' continuing cooperation.

¶15. (S//NF) Following is the 2008 Critical Foreign Dependencies Initiative (CFDI) list (CI/KR organized by region): [BEGIN TEXT OF LIST]

AFRICA Congo (Kinshasa): Cobalt (Mine and Plant) Gabon: Manganese - Battery grade, natural; battery grade, synthetic; chemical grade; ferro; metallurgical grade Guinea: Bauxite (Mine) South Africa: BAE Land System OMC, Benoni, South Africa Brown David Gear Industries LTD, Benoni, South Africa Bushveld Complex (chromite mine) Ferrochromium Manganese - Battery grade, natural; battery grade, synthetic; chemical grade; ferro; metallurgical grade Palladium Mine and Plant Platinum Mines Rhodium EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC Australia: Southern Cross undersea cable landing, Brookvale, Australia Southern Cross undersea cable landing, Sydney, Australia Manganese - Battery grade, natural; battery grade, synthetic; chemical grade; ferro; metallurgical grade Nickel Mines Maybe Faulding Mulgrave Victoria, Australia: Manufacturing facility for Midazolam injection. Mayne Pharma (fill/finish), Melbourne, Australia: Sole suppliers of Crotalid Polyvalent Antivenin (CroFab). China: C2C Cable Network undersea cable landing, Chom Hom Kok, Hong Kong C2C Cable Network undersea cable landing Shanghai, China China-US undersea cable landing, Chongming, China China-US undersea cable landing Shantou, China EAC undersea cable landing Tseung Kwan O, Hong Kong FLAG/REACH North Asia Loop undersea cable landing Tong Fuk, Hong Kong Hydroelectric Dam Turbines and Generators Fluorspar (Mine) Germanium Mine Graphite Mine Rare Earth Minerals/Elements Tin Mine and Plant Tungsten - Mine and Plant Polypropylene Filter Material for N-95 Masks Shanghai Port Guangzhou Port Hong Kong Port Ningbo Port Tianjin Port Fiji: Southern Cross undersea cable landing, Suva, Fiji Indonesia: Tin Mine and Plant Straits of Malacca Japan: C2C Cable Network undersea cable landing, Chikura, Japan C2C Cable Network undersea cable landing, Shima, Japan China-US undersea cable, Okinawa, Japan EAC undersea cable landing Ajigaura, Japan EAC undersea cable landing Shima, Japan FLAG/REACH North Asia Loop undersea cable landing Wada, Japan FLAG/REACH North Asia Loop undersea cable landing Wada, Japan Japan-US undersea cable landing, Maruyama, Japan Japan-US undersea cable landing Kitaibaraki, Japan KJCN undersea cable landing Fukuoka, Japan KJCN undersea cable landing Kita-Kyushu, Japan Pacific Crossing-1 (PC-1) undersea cable landing Ajigaura, Japan Pacific Crossing-1 (PC-1) undersea cable landing Shima, Japan Tyco Transpacific undersea cable landing, Toyohashi, Japan Tyco Transpacific undersea cable landing Emi, Japan Hitachi, Hydroelectric Dam Turbines and Generators Port of Chiba Port of Kobe Port of Nagoya Port of Yokohama Iodine Mine Metal Fabrication Machines Titanium Metal (Processed) Biken, Kanonji City, Japan Hitachi Electrical Power Generators and Components Large AC Generators above 40 MVA Malaysia: Straits of Malacca New Zealand: Southern Cross undersea cable landing, Whenuapai, New Zealand Southern Cross undersea cable landing, Takapuna, New Zealand Philippines: C2C Cable Network undersea cable landing, Batangas, Philippines EAC undersea cable landing Cavite, Philippines Republic of Korea: C2C Cable Network undersea cable landing, Pusan, Republic of Korea. EAC undersea cable landing Shindu-Ri, Republic of Korea FLAG/REACH North Asia Loop undersea cable landing Pusan, Republic of Korea KJCN undersea cable landing Pusan, Republic of Korea Hitachi Large Electric Power Transformers 230 - 500 kV Busan Port Singapore: C2C Cable Network undersea cable landing, Changi, Singapore EAC undersea cable landing Changi North, Singapore Port of Singapore Straits of Malacca Taiwan: C2C Cable Network undersea cable landing, Fangshan, Taiwan C2C Cable Network undersea cable landing, Tanshui, Taiwan China-US undersea cable landing Fangshan, Taiwan EAC undersea cable landing Pa Li, Taiwan FLAG/REACH North Asia Loop undersea cable landing Toucheng, Taiwan Kaohsiung Port EUROPE AND EURASIA Europe (Unspecified): Metal Fabrication Machines: Small number of Turkish companies (Durma, Baykal, Ermaksan) Austria: Baxter AG, Vienna, Austria: Immune Globulin Intravenous (IGIV) Octapharma Pharmazeutika, Vienna, Austria: Immune Globulin Intravenous (IGIV) Azerbaijan: Sangachal Terminal Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline Belarus: Druzhba Oil Pipeline Belgium: Germanium Mine Baxter SA, Lessines, Belgium: Immune Globulin Intravenous (IGIV) Glaxo Smith Kline, Rixensart, Belgium: Acellular Pertussis Vaccine Component GlaxoSmithKline Biologicals SA, Wavre, Belgium: Acellular Pertussis Vaccine Component Port of Antwerp Denmark: TAT-14 undersea cable landing, Blaabjerg, Denmark Bavarian Nordic (BN), Hejreskovvej, Kvistgard, Denmark: Smallpox Vaccine Novo Nordisk Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Bagsvaerd, Denmark: Numerous formulations of insulin Novo Nordisk Insulin Manufacturer: Global insulin supplies Statens Serum Institut, Copenhagen, Denmark: DTaP (including D and T components) pediatric version France: APOLLO undersea cable, Lannion, France FA-1 undersea cable, Plerin, France TAT-14 undersea cable landing St. Valery, France Sanofi-Aventis Insulin Manufacturer: Global insulin supplies Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine finishing Alstrom, Hydroelectric Dam Turbines and Generators Alstrom Electrical Power Generators and Components EMD Pharms Semoy, France: Cyanokit Injection GlaxoSmithKline, Inc. Evreux, France: Influenza neurominidase inhibitor RELENZA (Zanamivir) Diagast, Cedex, France: Olympus (impacts blood typing ability) Genzyme Polyclonals SAS (bulk), Lyon, France: Thymoglobulin Sanofi Pasteur SA, Lyon, France: Rabies virus vaccine Georgia: Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline Germany: TAT-14 undersea cable landing, Nodren, Germany. Atlantic Crossing-1 (AC-1) undersea cable landing Sylt, Germany BASF Ludwigshafen: World's largest integrated chemical complex Siemens Erlangen: Essentially irreplaceable production of key chemicals Siemens, GE, Hydroelectric Dam Turbines and Generators Draeger Safety AG & Co., Luebeck, Germany: Critical to gas detection capability Junghans Fienwerktechnik Schramberg, Germany: Critical to the production of mortars TDW-Gasellschaft Wirksysteme, Schroebenhausen, Germany: Critical to the production of the Patriot Advanced Capability Lethality Enhancement Assembly Siemens, Large Electric Power Transformers 230 - 500 kV Siemens, GE Electrical Power Generators and Components Druzhba Oil Pipeline Sanofi Aventis Frankfurt am Main, Germany: Lantus Injection (insulin) Heyl Chemish-pharmazeutische Fabrik GmbH: Radiogardase (Prussian blue) Hameln Pharmaceuticals, Hameln, Germany: Pentetate Calcium Trisodium (Ca DTPA) and Pentetate Zinc Trisodium (Zn DTPA) for contamination with plutonium, americium, and curium IDT Biologika GmbH, Dessau Rossiau, Germany: BN Small Pox Vaccine. Biotest AG, Dreiech, Germany: Supplier for TANGO (impacts automated blood typing ability) CSL Behring GmbH, Marburg, Germany: Antihemophilic factor/von Willebrand factor Novartis Vaccines and Diagnostics GmbH, Marburg, Germany: Rabies virus vaccine Vetter Pharma Fertigung GmbH & Co KG, Ravensburg, Germany (filling): Rho(D) IGIV Port of Hamburg Ireland: Hibernia Atlantic undersea cable landing, Dublin Ireland Genzyme Ireland Ltd. (filling), Waterford, Ireland: Thymoglobulin Italy: Glaxo Smith Kline SpA (fill/finish), Parma, Italy: Digibind (used to treat snake bites) Trans-Med gas pipeline Netherlands: Atlantic Crossing-1 (AC-1) undersea cable landing Beverwijk, Netherlands TAT-14 undersea cable landing, Katwijk, Netherlands Rotterdam Port Norway: Cobalt Nickel Mine Poland: Druzhba Oil Pipeline Russia: Novorossiysk Export Terminal Primorsk Export Terminal. Nadym Gas Pipeline Junction: The most critical gas facility in the world Uranium Nickel Mine: Used in certain types of stainless steel and superalloys Palladium Mine and Plant Rhodium Spain: Strait of Gibraltar Instituto Grifols, SA, Barcelona, Spain: Immune Globulin Intravenous (IGIV) Maghreb-Europe (GME) gas pipeline, Algeria Sweden: Recip AB Sweden: Thyrosafe (potassium iodine) Switzerland: Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc. Basel, Switzerland: Tamiflu (oseltamivir) Berna Biotech, Berne, Switzerland: Typhoid vaccine CSL Behring AG, Berne, Switzerland: Immune Globulin Intravenous (IGIV) Turkey: Metal Fabrication Machines: Small number of Turkish companies (Durma, Baykal, Ermaksan) Bosporus Strait Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline Ukraine: Manganese - Battery grade, natural; battery grade, synthetic; chemical grade; ferro; metallurgical grade United Kingdom: Goonhilly Teleport, Goonhilly Downs, United Kingdom Madley Teleport, Stone Street, Madley, United Kingdom Martelsham Teleport, Ipswich, United Kingdom APOLLO undersea cable landing Bude, Cornwall Station, United Kingdom Atlantic Crossing-1 (AC-1) undersea cable landing Whitesands Bay FA-1 undersea cable landing Skewjack, Cornwall Station Hibernia Atlantic undersea cable landing, Southport, United Kingdom TAT-14 undersea cable landing Bude, Cornwall Station, United Kingdom Tyco Transatlantic undersea cable landing, Highbridge, United Kingdom Tyco Transatlantic undersea cable landing, Pottington, United Kingdom. Yellow/Atlantic Crossing-2 (AC-2) undersea cable landing Bude, United Kingdom Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine finishing BAE Systems (Operations) Ltd., Presont, Lancashire, United Kingdom: Critical to the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter BAE Systems Operations Ltd., Southway, Plymouth Devon, United Kingdom: Critical to extended range guided munitions BAE Systems RO Defense, Chorley, United Kingdom: Critical to the Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW) AGM-154C (Unitary Variant) MacTaggart Scott, Loanhead, Edinburgh, Lothian, Scotland, United Kingdom: Critical to the Ship Submersible Nuclear (SSN) NEAR/MIDDLE EAST Djibouti: Bab al-Mendeb: Shipping lane is a critical supply chain node Egypt: 'Ayn Sukhnah-SuMEd Receiving Import Terminal 'Sidi Kurayr-SuMed Offloading Export Terminal Suez Canal Iran: Strait of Hormuz Khark (Kharg) Island Sea Island Export Terminal Khark Island T-Jetty Iraq: Al-Basrah Oil Terminal Israel: Rafael Ordnance Systems Division, Haifa, Israel: Critical to Sensor Fused Weapons (SFW), Wind Corrected Munitions Dispensers (WCMD), Tail Kits, and batteries Kuwait: Mina' al Ahmadi Export Terminal Morocco: Strait of Gibraltar Maghreb-Europe (GME) gas pipeline, Morocco Oman: Strait of Hormuz Qatar: Ras Laffan Industrial Center: By 2012 Qatar will be the largest source of imported LNG to U.S. Saudi Arabia: Abqaiq Processing Center: Largest crude oil processing and stabilization plant in the world Al Ju'aymah Export Terminal: Part of the Ras Tanura complex As Saffaniyah Processing Center Qatif Pipeline Junction Ras at Tanaqib Processing Center Ras Tanura Export Terminal Shaybah Central Gas-oil Separation Plant Tunisia: Trans-Med Gas Pipeline United Arab Emirates (UAE): Das Island Export Terminal Jabal Zannah Export Terminal Strait of Hormuz Yemen: Bab al-Mendeb: Shipping lane is a critical supply chain node SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA Kazakhstan: Ferrochromium Khromtau Complex, Kempersai, (Chromite Mine) India: Orissa (chromite mines) and Karnataka (chromite mines) Generamedix Gujurat, India: Chemotherapy agents, including florouracil and methotrexate WESTERN HEMISPHERE Argentina: Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine finishing Bermuda: GlobeNet (formerly Bermuda US-1 (BUS-1) undersea cable landing Devonshire, Bermuda Brazil: Americas-II undersea cable landing Fortaleza, Brazil GlobeNet undersea cable landing Fortaleza, Brazil GlobeNet undersea cable landing Rio de Janeiro, Brazil Iron Ore from Rio Tinto Mine Manganese - Battery grade, natural; battery grade, synthetic; chemical grade; ferro; metallurgical grade Niobium (Columbium), Araxa, Minas Gerais State (mine) Ouvidor and Catalao I, Goias State: Niobium Chile: Iodine Mine Canada: Hibernia Atlantic undersea cable landing Halifax , Nova Scotia, Canada James Bay Power Project, Quebec: monumental hydroelectric power development Mica Dam, British Columbia: Failure would impact the Columbia River Basin. Hydro Quebec, Quebec: Critical irreplaceable source of power to portions of Northeast U. S. Robert Moses/Robert H. Saunders Power, Ontario: Part of the St. Lawrence Power Project, between Barnhart Island, New York, and Cornwall, Ontario Seven Mile Dam, British Columbia: Concrete gravity dam between two other hydropower dams along the Pend d'Oreille River Pickering Nuclear Power Plant, Ontario, Canada Chalk River Nuclear Facility, Ontario: Largest supplier of medical radioisotopes in the world Hydrofluoric Acid Production Facility, Allied Signal, Amherstburg, Ontario Enbridge Pipeline Alliance Pipeline: Natural gas transmission from Canada Maritime and Northeast Pipeline: Natural gas transmission from Canada Transcanada Gas: Natural gas transmission from Canada Alexandria Bay POE, Ontario: Northern border crossing Ambassador Bridge POE, Ontario: Northern border crossing Blaine POE, British Columbia: Northern border crossing Blaine Washington Rail Crossing, British Columbia Blue Water Bridge POE, Ontario: Northern border crossing Champlain POE, Quebec: Northern border crossing CPR Tunnel Rail Crossing, Ontario (Michigan Central Rail Crossing) International Bridge Rail Crossing, Ontario International Railway Bridge Rail Crossing Lewiston-Queenstown POE, Ontario: Northern border crossing Peace Bridge POE, Ontario: Northern border crossing Pembina POE, Manitoba: Northern border crossing North Portal Rail Crossing, Saskatchewan St. Claire Tunnel Rail Crossing, Ontario Waneta Dam, British Columbia: Earthfill/concrete hydropower dam Darlington Nuclear Power Plant, Ontario, Canada. E-ONE Moli Energy, Maple Ridge, Canada: Critical to production of various military application electronics General Dynamics Land Systems - Canada, London Ontario, Canada: Critical to the production of the Stryker/USMC LAV Vehicle Integration Raytheon Systems Canada Ltd. ELCAN Optical Technologies Division, Midland, Ontario, Canada: Critical to the production of the AGM-130 Missile Thales Optronique Canada, Inc., Montreal, Quebec: Critical optical systems for ground combat vehicles Germanium Mine Graphite Mine Iron Ore Mine Nickel Mine Niobec Mine, Quebec, Canada: Niobium Cangene, Winnipeg, Manitoba: Plasma Sanofi Pasteur Ltd., Toronto, Canada: Polio virus vaccine GlaxoSmithKile Biologicals, North America, Quebec, Canada: Pre-pandemic influenza vaccines French Guiana: Americas-II undersea cable landing Cayenne, French Guiana Martinique: Americas-II undersea cable landing Le Lamentin, Martinique Mexico: FLAG/REACH North Asia Loop undersea cable landing Tijuana, Mexico Pan-American Crossing (PAC) undersea cable landing Mazatlan, Mexico Amistad International Dam: On the Rio Grande near Del Rio, Texas and Ciudad Acuna, Coahuila, Mexico Anzalduas Dam: Diversion dam south of Mission, Texas, operated jointly by the U.S. and Mexico for flood control Falcon International Dam: Upstream of Roma, Texas and Miguel Aleman, Tamaulipas, Mexico Retamal Dam: Diversion dam south of Weslaco, Texas, operated jointly by the U.S. and Mexico for flood control GE Hydroelectric Dam Turbines and Generators: Main source for a large portion of larger components Bridge of the Americas: Southern border crossing Brownsville POE: Southern border crossing Calexico East POE: Southern border crossing Columbia Solidarity Bridge: Southern border crossing Kansas City Southern de Mexico (KCSM) Rail Line, (Mexico) Nogales POE: Southern border crossing Laredo Rail Crossing Eagle Pass Rail Crossing Otay Mesa Crossing: Southern border crossing Pharr International Bridge: Southern border crossing World Trade Bridge: Southern border crossing Ysleta Zaragosa Bridge: Southern border crossing Hydrofluoric Acid Production Facility Graphite Mine GE Electrical Power Generators and Components General Electric, Large Electric Power Transformers 230 - 500 kV Netherlands Antilles: Americas-II undersea cable landing Willemstad, Netherlands Antilles. Panama: FLAG/REACH North Asia Loop undersea cable landing Fort Amador, Panama Panama Canal Peru: Tin Mine and Plant Trinidad and Tobago: Americas-II undersea cable landing Port of Spain Atlantic LNG: Provides 70% of U.S. natural gas import needs Venezuela: Americas-II undersea cable landing Camuri, Venezuela GlobeNet undersea cable landing, Punta Gorda, Venezuela GlobeNet undersea cable landing Catia La Mar, Venezuela GlobeNet undersea cable landing Manonga, Venezuela [END TEXT OF LIST]

¶16. (U//FOUO) Minimize considered. CLINTON


Un télégramme du département d'Etat datant de février 2009 demande en effet aux représentations diplomatiques américaines de recenser les "infrastructures sensibles et ressources clés" à l'étranger "dont la perte affecterait de manière significative la santé publique, la sécurité économique et/ou la sécurité nationale des Etats-Unis" La mise à jour cette liste visait à "prévenir, dissuader et neutraliser ou atténuer les effets d'actes terroristes visant à détruire, bloquer ou exploiter" ces infrastructures.

Plusieurs sites en France

Que trouve-t-on dans cette liste ? Outre des infrastructures stratégiques (câbles sous-marins de télécommunications, ports, barrages, oléoducs, gazoducs..), la liste recense également, entre autres, le canal de Panama, une mine de cobalt au Congo, d'autres mines en Afrique du Sud et Amérique latine ainsi que des entreprises pharmaceutiques produisant des vaccins au Danemark, en Italie, en Allemagne et en Australie.

Et en France ? La liste cite les groupes pharmaceutiques Sanofi-Aventis, EMD Pharms, GlaxoSmithKline (notamment le site d'Evreux), Diagast (réactifs pour les groupes sanguins) et Sanofi Pasteur (vaccins contre la rage, notamment le site de Lyon) ainsi que le groupe industriel Alstom et les points d'arrivée de câbles de télécommunication transatlantiques, à Plérin et Lannion. Deux sites outre-Mer, points d'arrivée du câble sous-marin Americas-II sont évoqués : l'un à Cayenne, en Guyane, et l'autre au Lamentin, en Martinique.